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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LEGAL JUDGMENTS
F.S.C. Northrop*
T HERE are three major ways of understanding any subject. The
science of epistemology tells us what they are. It does this by investi-
gating our human ways of knowing, with particular reference to how words
obtain their various species of meanings. Since law, perhaps more than
most subjects, is concerned with the use and the interpretation of lan-
guage, it may help us to understand and evaluate the all-or-none principle
in legal judgments if we describe three major epistemological theories of
knowledge, including their respective conceptions of the meaning of
words, and relate them to the settling of legal disputes.
I
The remarkable developments in mathematical physics during this
century forced the physicists and mathematicians, such as Mach, Einstein
and Whitehead, to become epistemologists, not merely reexamining the
relation between directly observable data and the elementary concepts and
premises of their science, but also watching with meticulous care the
different ways in which their mathematical and ordinary linguistic sym-
bols get their various kinds of meanings. Again and again Whitehead
emphasized that one cannot be too suspicious of ordinary language in
science and philosophy. In a final comment on the meaning of recent
physics and the significance of his own part therein, Einstein wrote:
The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of note-
worthy kind. They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology
without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science with-
out epistemology is-insofar as it is thinkable at all-primitive and
muddled.1
The reasons for Whitehead's suspicion of an epistemologically un-
critical use of ordinary language in any subject have been summarized
and expanded by the writer elsewhere. 2 Briefly, the danger is that its
two-termed subject-predicate syntax leads one unconsciously to falsify
the facts of one's subject in the very act of stating what they are. More
specifically, direct observation shows that any sensed quality is related
to other factors in immediate experience by many-termed relations; it is
* Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law Emeritus, Yale University.
'ALBERT EINSTEIN: PHILOSOPHER-ScIENTIsT 683-84 (Schilpp ed. 1949). [Hereinafter cited
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2 NORTHROP, MAN, NATURE AND GOD ch. 11 (1962).
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not related as the predicate of a local, supposedly underlying self-sufficient
substance, after the manner in which ordinary language leads many to
suppose. For example, the light blue color which I see at the present
moment when I direct my gaze "at Squam Lake" is not, as ordinary
linquistic thinking supposes, fastened as a permanently attached predicate
to some underlying aggregate of material substances called "the water in
Squam Lake"; instead, the sensed blueness is a many-termed relational
function of the state of the water's surface, the intensity of the sunshine,
the place where I am located, and even the rods and cones in my eyeballs.
The epistemological error of confusing the two-termed grammar of
Aryan prose with the nature of things can be serious. In the case of visually
and tactually sensed qualities, it misled most modem scientists and philos-
ophers into populating the universe with countless nonexistent under-
lying material substances that were purported to be as directly sensed as
were the qualities that were erroneously supposed to qualify them; and,
in the case of one's "inner" sensations of pain or pleasure, it added simi-
larly underlying and nonexistent mental substances that were supposed
also to be directly observed.
The generally accepted name for this linguistically uncritical and
erroneous theory of knowledge, and its meaning of words, is naive realism.
Realism is the thesis that human knowing gives objective knowledge, i.e.,
knowledge that is the same for all observers or, to use the language of
mathematical physics, which remains constant or invariant for any change
of standpoint or "transformation of coordinates." Naive realism is the
thesis that such knowledge is given naively, that is, directly, by observation,
with the senses alone. Linguistically stated, naive realism is that notion of
human knowing in any subject which thinks of its particular subject
matter in terms of supposedly local, directly sensed things, the defining
properties of which are also directly sensed. Aristotelian physics was naive
realistic because it defined its elementary scientific objects in terms of the
directly sensed qualities hot, cold, wet and dry.
The error in naive realistic thinking and its interpretation of the
meaning of words did not originate with Whitehead, even though he
gave an independent and fresh demonstration of it.3 It was evident to
ancient Confucian, Buddhist and Hindu Asian epistemologists, to classical
Greek and Roman Sophist, Democritean, Platonic and Stoic investigators
of human knowledge, to the founders of modern physics, Galilei and
Newton, when they rejected the aforementioned naive realistic scientific
objects of Aristotelian and medieval scholastic science and theology, and
to the modern British epistemologists Berkeley and Hume. Quite inde-
pendently these Asian and Western experts in the theory of knowledge
made two things clear:
WHITEHEAD, TnE CONCEPT OF NATURE (1920); WHITEHEAD, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE (1919).
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First, a careful examination of the data of the senses shows that they
are not objective or external in the sense of existing independently of
their relation to the observer. Instead, the images given to the senses vary
from one perceiver to another, one moment to another, one place to
another, where the observer may happen to be standing or may choose as
his frame of reference, and even from one sense organ to another of the
same observer. This is what Berkeley expressed in his dictum that, for all
knowledge given to the senses, esse est percipi by a particular perceiver.
Thus, just as in contemporary physical knowledge, it is meaningless to
say that two spatially separated events in the sky occur at the same moment
in public time, unless one also specifies the frame of reference relative to
which this is the case, so it is meaningless for the layman to say that a
sensed region of sensed space is blue unless there is added the particular
observer for whom, the moment when, and the place from which this is
the case for him. As Einstein once remarked to the writer, "Berkeley was a
genius," adding, by way of explanation, "Anyone should see that we do
not observe scientific objects. It took a genius to realize that the same is
true of common-sense objects." Instead, the data of the senses are tem-
porally successive, unique, perishing particulars, each of which is relative
to the perceiver and, as Whitehead reminds us, to many other factors of
sensed fact as well; the sensed perceiver in turn being also merely a unique
temporal succession of perishing particulars.
Second, the Oriental and Occidental epistemologists, referred to above,
noted that the senses do not give the idea of substance.4 This is the case
whether the purported directly sensed or introspected substances be those
of Aristotle and the Scholastics; the material substances of Hobbes, Marx
and the Asian Charvakian materialists; the mental substances of Berkeley,
Leibniz, Lotze, Cousin, Kraus and the lawyer Ahrens,5 or the interacting
material and mental substances of Descartes, Locke and the Asian Vaisesika
dualists. Misled, probably by the thing-property syntax of Aryan prose,
all these naive realists wrote what has been aptly called "metaphysical
nonsense," when they thought they were merely describing the directly
observable data of anyone's immediate experience.
It is important that we have a name for that part of, and kind of,
human knowing which is given naively in direct observation, i.e., by the
senses alone, when such knowledge is not falsified, in the very act of
stating what it is, by being thrust into the Procrustean bed that is the
two-termed thing-property grammar of ordinary language. The name
4 Berkeley showed this to be the case for material substances. Hume showed it to
be equally true for mental substances.
5 For a description of the prodigious legal, political and cultural influence of this
naive realistic spiritual pluralism throughout Latin America in the first decade of this
century, see NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACTICAL POLITICS 123-42
(1960).
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used by expert epistemologists the world over for this theory of knowledge
is radical empiricism or positivism. Legal positivism is therefore the thesis
that the language of the law and its procedural rules and norms for settling
disputes find their entire meaning and sole warrant in items of knowing
given by the senses alone. Clearly the difference between interpreting lan-
guage in a naive realistic or in a radical empirical way is likely to be of
considerable legal significance.
II
A comparison of ancient Asian and Greek epistemology and law shows
that most people throughout the world thought initially in a combination
of naive realistic and radical empirical terms and found meaning and
warrant for their ethical and legal beliefs, practices and procedures in
such a compound theory of knowledge. The present occasion permits
merely a statement of conclusions, the evidence for which has been given
elsewhere. 6 To a first approximation, it appears that all people originally
thought naively realistically only about their own bodily and other local
terrestrial phenomena, and radically empirically about the other data of
their immediate experience.
Consequently, insofar as they grounded the meaning of their norma-
tive personal moral, and official legal language in the naive realistic por-
tion of their thinking, they identified moral and legal rights, obligations,
and duties with naively sensed bodily color of skin, racial ancestry, differ-
ences in sex, and primogeniture, or nonprimogeniture, of birth. In other
words, their personal moral and public legal norms were those of the
patriarchal or matriarchal joint family or tribe, with its ideal of racial
purity of ancestry, and, in cases of a society of different races, its legal codes
and customs of caste, as instanced in the oldest law books of Aryan Hindu
India. Recently, the Indian philosophers, Professors D. M. Datta and P. T.
Raju, have shown 7 that these law books were written by lawyers who were
naive realistic Vaisesika dualists-dualistic because they believed, like the
early modern Western Descartes and Locke, in the aforementioned mate-
rial and mental substances; naive realistic because they supposed these
substances to be directly sensed. In the ancient West this naive realistic
theory of the meaning of and warrant for the litigational settling of dis-
putes in terms of all-or-none principles with naively sensed, and conceived,
bodily and racially focused patriarchal content, shows in the pater familias
described in Fustel de Coulanges' The Ancient City and 0. W. Westrup's
Introduction to Early Roman Law. In short, the naive realistic portion
6 Northrop, The Comparative Philosophy of Comparative Law, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 617
(1960). See also the forthcoming symposium volume, LIVINGSTON & NORTHROP, CRoss-
CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: EPISTEMOLOGY IN ANTHROPOLOGY.
7 PHILOSOPHY ANn CULTURE EAST AND WEsT 569-93, 263-92 (Moore ed. 1962).
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of the thought and language of the ancient world, both Oriental and
Occidental, gave meaning and warrant to the all-or-none litigational codes
of what Sir Henry Maine in his Ancient Law called a "law of Status"
society, where "Status" is defined in terms of, and is relative to, naively
sensed biological differences in color of skin, genealogical ancestry, sex and
temporal order of birth. Procedurewise, this meant that a legal judgment
could be rendered when the judge had before him the genealogical tables
of the parties to any dispute.
Ancient Asian empirical science and normative morals and law are
somewhat unique however in combining this naive realistic law of tribe,
ancestral family and caste with a radical empirical theory of the person,
and then giving the latter normative primacy.8 This shows in the Laws of
Manu, for example, where the ethics of family-focused personal morality
and of caste are assigned to the second, or Householder, stage of the Aryan
Hindu's life; with the radical empirical theory of the moral, legal and
religious person (in which all people are undifferentiatedly identical with
one another and with the divine Atman-that-is-Brahman) giving the norms
for conduct in the first (Student) and the last two (Hermit and Ascetic)
stages of the Aryan Hindu's life.
In their legal positivism, the Asian radical empirical lawyers were
much more consistent than were their modern Anglo-American counter-
parts. As shown in the previous section, on a radical empirical theory of
knowledge and the meaning of words, universal laws are left meaningless.
Such is the case because, as noted above, radical empiricism or positivism
affirms that any word (purporting to refer to anything determinate) is
meaningless unless it finds its entire meaning in data given directly
through the senses. But, sense awareness gives us only successive, perishing
particulars, each relative to the perceiver, his physical frame of reference
and his particular sense organs. Hence, it leaves meaningless the notion of
litigational common law, the same in content and obligatoriness for every-
one in the legal system.
Oriental radical empiricists accepted this consequence of their positiv-
ism by rejecting litigation with its all-or-none universal principles as a
warrantable or even a meaningful procedure for settling disputes. The
Confucian Chinese radical empiricists expressed this thesis by saying that
the superior man does not indulge in litigation.9 The Buddha, rejecting
8 For the radically empirical meaning and normative import of this primary person,
see NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PIACTICAL POLITICS ch. 19 (1960);
NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE ch. 16 (1959); NORTHROP,
THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST chs. 9 and 10 (1946); Northrop, The Mediational Ap-
proval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism, 44 VA. L. REv. 347, 356-60 (1958).
'CHIANG, TIDES FROM THE WasT 252 (1947); Liu, Some Observations on Judges,
Lawyers and Court Administration in China, 7 NAT'L RECONSTRUCTION J. 3 (No. 4,
1947).
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the naive realistic concept of the person, repudiated its morals and law
of Status and caste for that of the aforementioned radically empirical
undifferentiated person. Practically, this means that the preferred legal
procedure is that of mediation by way of a middleman or go-between.
It is to be emphasized, therefore, that mediation, unrestricted by litiga-
tion or positive rules of arbitration, is the only meaningful method of
dispute settling for a consistent legal positivist. Moreover, in radical
empirical knowing it is not merely the meaning of normative words, such
as good and bad, just or unjust, that are privately relative to the evaluator,
as the positivists Hume' 0 and Hand"1 noted; the same is true also of "the
facts of the case," the minor premise, in any litigational legal judgment.
For in knowledge given wholly through the senses the pleasant facts which
you sense, when you see me "floating through the breeze with the greatest
of ease," after you have hit me with your automobile, are quite different
from those that I sense. In other words, only a realistic epistemology, with
its truly objective knowledge the same in content for all knowers and all
parties to any dispute, can provide either a meaning or a warrant for litiga-
tional law, i.e., for the settling of a dispute by measuring the facts of the
case against universal legal rules, which are all-or-none norms of decision.
This becomes even more evident when we state the deliverances of
knowledge given wholly through the senses in positive rather than nega-
tive terms. As noted above, all such knowledge is meaningless apart from
the percipient for whom it is sensed to be the case. Also all items of sensed
knowledge are unique, temporally successive, perishing particulars. Hence,
immediately sensed events, such as "the collision between me and your
car," are similarly unique, radically empirical particulars. They are not
instances of a universal law. Being unique, the solution of the dispute
must therefore be unique. This also eliminates litigation, with its appeal
to universal all-or-none laws, as meaningful.
But how, then, if the sensed facts of the case for me are painful and
quite different from the pleasurable sensed facts of the case for you, can
any dispute be meaningfully settled for one who holds a radical empirical
theory of knowledge and the meaning of all words? The only meaningful
method is mediation through a middleman in which the latter functions
never as a judge, or even an arbitrator, but merely as a go-between at-
tempting the well-nigh impossible task of trying to put the one party to
the dispute emotively and empathetically inside the private, to-be-is-to-be-
perceived-by-me facts of the case as sensed by the other party. Moreover,
the dispute is neither meaningfully, nor effectively, settled until by this
process the disputants themselves, by better empathetic understanding of
10 HUME, A T.FATsE OF HuMAN NATURE 245 (1951).
31 Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes, 43 HARv. L. Rzv. 857 (1930), and reprinted in THE
SpIRrT OF LmRTy, PAPEnS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 57-65 (2d Dillard ed. 1953).
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each other's unique, privately relative facts-of-the-case come to an agree-
ment, usually involving concessions on both sides, concerning what is a
unique and emotively satisfying resolution of the perishing unique event
which was their particular dispute.
We draw, therefore, one important conclusion with respect to the
fundamental theme and problem of this legal conference. This conclusion
is that to the extent any contemporary branch of human society or positive
law is still only in a largely inductive case method and ordinary language
state of linguistic articulation, to that extent the litigational method of
dispute settling is not merely unwarranted but also meaningless. A cor-
ollary of this is that legal positivists such as Hume, Austin, Thayer and the
late Judge Hand, were talking "metaphysical nonsense," assuming their
positivistic epistemology to be the entire truth, when they adjudicated
disputes by appeal to universal positive legal codes.
That the latter is the case is shown by Austin's own so-called posi-
tivistic theory. The theory makes purely private personal moral judgments
meaningful, but fails for official litigational law. The former is the case
because all sensed knowledge is relative to the perceiver and hence a
theory of moral rights and obligations which makes them relative to the
perceiver is compatible with a positivistic epistemological theory of the
meaning of language. It provides meaning also for legal rules personally
assented to by the majority, or their officially elected representatives, so
long as these legal rules are interpreted as obligatory only for the specific
majority who assented to them. But no litigational system would exist
for a moment if its legal rules were not made obligatory for everybody in
it. In other words, the radical empirical or positivistic theory of law is in-
capable of solving what the writer in The Complexity of Legal and Ethical
Experience called the problem of legal induction,12 i.e., the problem of
making meaningful the induction from "x is approved by the majority"
to "x is obligatory for everyone in the legal system." Similarly, in pure
mathematics, scientists are now agreed that the radical empirical, or posi-
tivistic, theory of the meaning of all symbols cannot solve what mathe-
maticians have called the problem of mathematical induction. More
specifically, the radical empirical theory of the meaning of symbols leaves
Peano's Fifth Postulate for arithmetic not merely without any warrant, but
also meaningless. The same is true of the radical empirical theory of induc-
tion from experimental data to universal laws in mathematical physics, as
the sequel will show in more specific detail.
That the legal positivist Austin recognized this failure of his radical
empirical epistemological theory of the meaning of words, and his radical
empirical theory of the meaning of personal ethical language, to account
for the universal legal obligation which litigational law requires, is proved
1 NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHIcAL EXPERIENCE 297-300 (1959).
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by his own definition of the legal obligation of anyone in the legal system
to be judged by its majority-approved norms. In his famous definition of
law, its rules are not "laws, properly so-called" if the sovereign will or
command is that merely of the assenting majority; in addition the sover-
eign must have the power "to inflict an evil or pain," greater than that
possessed by any body of dissenters, to bear on anyone or all who dissent
from his commands.
But what do the words "power of the sovereign" in the Austinian
theory mean? On the positivistic theory of meaning, they denote merely
radically empirically sensed, Berkeleyian to-be-is-to-be-perceived by a par-
ticular person's power. This is no more meaningfully the same for every-
one in the legal system than are the similar radically empirical sensed
and conceived aforementioned "facts of the case" in the minor premise of
the legal positivist's judicial syllogism. Consequently, if Austin is to solve
his problem of legal induction in a way that makes litigational law mean-
ingful, by his questionable identification of legal and political obligation
with "power", he must have epistemologically realistic, i.e., objective
non-esse-est-percipi power; radically empirically conceived power will not
do. This is why he started out to be a thorough-going and consistent legal
positivist, only to end, in his notion of legal obligation, by embracing the
aforementioned naive realistic "metaphysical nonsense" that is (1) the
Hobbesian meaning of personal moral, as well as legal and political, free-
dom from which (2) the warrant for the Austinian-Hobbesian identifica-
tion of legal and political obligation with naive realistically conceived
power derives.
The Hobbesian naive realistic meaning of (1) is given in the Leviathan
where its author identifies normative personal moral, as well as civic legal
and political freedom with the nonnormative, unimpeded motion of an
"external" local naive realistically conceived material substance, even
emphasizing the latter notion by affirming that moral, legal and political
freedom applies as much to inorganic objects as to human beings'L3-a
consequence which, were it not nonsense, would make it meaningful to
say that a stone is naughty, or for a judge to decide that it is guilty of
murder if, when falling freely from a cliff, it hits (without any provocation
on the part o the deceased) a person to cause his death.
In short, the traditional Anglo-American "legal positivism" is a lin-
quistically misled and epistemol6gically "primitive and muddled" contra-
diction in terms. Insofar as it provides the meaning for "legal and political
obligation" that is required to make litigational law meaningful, it falls
into (a) the is-ought non sequitur noted by the positivistic Hume 4 and
13 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATrER, FORME AND POWER OF COMMONWEALTH Ec-
CLESLSTICALL AND CnxLL pt. 2 at 186-37 (undated).11 HuME, A TREATiSE OF HUMAN NATURE 245-46 (1951).
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(b) the metaphysical nonsense that is the naive realism of Hobbes' defini-
tion of normative freedom. To the extent, on the other hand, that it
remains consistently positivistic, i.e., radically empirical, it leaves litiga-
tional law meaningless.
Austin's final recourse to Hobbes' naive realism confirms, therefore,
the Oriental radical empirical lawyer's conclusion that the only con-
sistent legal positivism is one which settles disputes by mediation. In the
West, the only lawyer, to the writer's knowledge, with any intimation of
this was the late Dean Wesley A. Sturges. 15 In any event, litigational law
requires a realistic epistemology.
But we have already shown that the naive realistic theory of Hobbes,
with his material substances, or any other version of the naive realistic
theory of the meaning of language is erroneous. How then can the litiga-
tional method of dispute settling by the appeal to "the objective facts of
the case" and to universally lawful norms of decision be made either mean-
ingful or warrantable? It is at this point that Einstein's, as distinct from
Whitehead's, observation concerning the indispensability of epistemology
for science becomes important for the problem of this symposium.
III
What is the reason, within mathematical physics, for Einstein's state-
ment, quoted above, that "Science without epistemology is ... primitive
and muddled"? The answer is given by him in his collected papers,16 and
has been brought together by the writer with Einstein's following comment
in the Einstein volume of the Library of Living Philosophers. 7 Briefly
put, the answer is that Einstein and his most influential predecessor Mach
found their science of physics to be in a "primitive and muddled" state
because both physicists and philosophers of this subject had given the
mathematical physical concepts of mass, space and time a naive realistic
epistemological interpretation, thereby populating the universe with the
aforementioned nonexistent material substances, when, in fact, an analy-
sis of their mathematically linguistic meanings shows them to be non-
observable, logically realistic, many-termed relational, indirectly con-
firmed constructs.
More specifically, Mach showed that "a mass" is not the naively or
directly sensed thing-property material substance the modern materialists,
misled by ordinary language, had supposed it to be, but is instead a mathe-
matically linguistic, imageless, many-termed relational variable, all the
15Northrop, The Mediational Approval Theory of Law in American Legal Realism,
44 VA. L. Rv. 347 (1958).
'
8
EINSTEIN, THE WoRLD AS I SEE IT (1934).
'7 Northrop, Einstein's Conception of Science, in ALBERT EINSTEIN, op. Cit. supra note
1, at 385-408.
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scientific properties of which derive from the formal properties of the
relations (the mathematical equations of Newton's laws of motion) in
which the symbol m functions as a relatum or term. Similarly, after noting
the immediately sensed data of the Michelson-Morley experiment and
turning epistemologist to reexamine afresh the relation in human knowing
between the deliverances of our senses and the theoretical concepts and
laws of mathematical physics, Einstein showed the following things: (1)
The deliverances of the human senses do not warrant the layman's and
the physicist's belief in external objects in public space and time. Why?
(2) Because (a) to be an external object means to be in public space and
time; (b) public time entails a meaning for the public simultaneity of
spatially separated events; and (c) such public meaningful simultaneity is
not given through the senses. Hence, (3) both the radical empirical and the
naive realistic theory of the meaning of anyone's belief in external objects
in public space and time is false; in short, neither common-sense nor sci-
entific objectivity is given directly by observation. Consequently, (4) if
the layman's and the scientist's belief in public objects in public space
and time is meaningful, as our mathematically constructed Greenwich
time with its mathematically and astronomically set and synchronized
clocks shows is the case, then space and time as well as mass, must be specu-
latively discovered, logically realistic relational constructs, the confirmation
of which is indirect. Finally, (5) because of the deliverance of our senses in
the Michelson-Morley experiment and, as described in (2b and c) just
above, the logical realistic constructs of mass, space and time must be
different from those of Newton; the latter's coming out of those of Ein-
stein's Special and General Theories of Relativity as a very important
and prevalent, but nonetheless restricted special case. Thus Einstein
writes:
Since ... sense perception only gives information of [the] external
world or of "physical reality" indirectly, we can only grasp the latter
by speculative means. It follows from this that our notions of physical
reality can never be final. We must always be ready to change these
notions-that is to say, the axiomatic substructure of physics [i.e.,
the relationally axiomaticized constructs]-in order to do justice to
perceived facts in the most logically perfect way.'S
In short, the fundamental concepts and laws of Western mathematical
physics are logically realistic, rather than naively realistic or radically
empirical, concepts.
Being unobservable, these logically realistic constructs have to be
epistemologically correlated, through their deduced concepts or theorems,
with the radically empirical data, relative to each frame of reference, each
perceiver and his various sense organs, which are given through the senses.
Is EinsiN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 60.
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Otherwise, theory designating these logically realistic, speculatively dis-
covered scientific objects and universal laws cannot be put even to an in-
direct empirical test. Hence, the epistemology required by an epistemologi-
cal analysis of (1) the deliverances of our senses and (2) the imageless,
logically and mathematically relational constructs of mathematical physics
is (1) logical realism in epistemic correlation 9 with (2) nominalistic radical
empiricism.
It is the speculatively discovered and relationally constructed logical
factor in this compound way of knowing that gives both common-sense and
scientific knowledge its meaningful objectivity, the same in content for
all perceivers. The criterion of this realistic objectivity is invariance of
the relational constructs and laws for all observers or any transformation
of coordinates. It is the noninvariant part of the logically realistic sci-
entific theory that designates the knowledge which holds only for a par-
ticular frame of reference, moment, perceiver or one of his senses. It is the
epistemological correlation of (1) the latter noninvariant part of logically
realistic scientific theory, with (2) the completely relative radical empirical
data given through the senses, that gives such logical realistic speculatively
discovered and relationally constructed knowledge its indirect empirical
and experimental testability. Consequently, in such theory meaning and
testability must be distinguished. Also, otherwise the radical empirical
references required for testability are confused with the logical realistic
theoretical meaning of the theory that is tested. Then muddled results and
erroneous inferences are made. This is avoided if it is noted that in logical
realistic scientific theory, meaning is completely logical realistic, and the
additional epistemically correlated radical empirical meanings and refer-
ences are required only for testability.
Einstein was well aware that the discovery of logically realistic con-
structs was not original with him or with Mach. All non-Aristotelian
Western mathematical physics contains them. They were discovered by the
Democritean, Platonic and Stoic Greek mathematical physicists. The
contemporary mathematical physicist, Greek classicist and historian of
science, Professor S. Sambursky, has shown2 0 that this epistemological
theory of logically realistic constructs, confirmed indirectly by the correla-
tion of their deduced theorems with radically empirically sensed data,
reached its highest ancient articulation with the Stoic Greek physicist,
Chrysippus. Einstein was well aware of this originality of the Greek mathe-
matical physicists. He writes: "If Euclid failed to kindle your youthful
enthusiasm, then you were not born to be a scientific thinker." 21 Later he
"This relation and its importance will be described in the sequel. See also NoR-
TRop, THE LOGIC OF TIM SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES ch. 7 (1947).
'0 SAMBURSKY, PHYSICS OF THE STOICS (1959).
n EINSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 32.
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adds that in mathematical physics, one "can grasp reality, as the ancients
dreamed."2
2
Chrysippus was also one of the most important formulators of the Stoic
ethical, legal and political doctrine that moral and just man is not naive
realistically sensed, color-of-skin, bodily, sexual or racial man, but cos-
mopolitan man, i.e., any one person, standing in equity, with any other,
irrespective of naively sensed bodily differences in racial color of skin, sex
or temporal order of birth, before a contractually constructed common law.
Chrysippus logically formalized all his conceptions. The logic of proposi-
tions, and especially that of hypothetical propositions and syllogism, which
are formal prerequisites for the logical realistic scientific method of in-
direct testability, are in major part his creation. They are a prerequisite
also for the contractual law of contingent remainders and executory in-
terests. Similarly, only a logically realistic, relational concept of the legal
person, conceived in terms of any human being whatever, universally
quantified, can give the Roman legal concept of jus in rem in the law of
real property. Neither a radical empirical nor a naive realistic concept of
the legal person can do so. Trusts and corporations are logically realistic
constructs. In short, there are reasons for believing that Western con-
tractual law arose when (1) the erroneous character of naive realistically
conceived common-sense or scientific objects was made evident by the
radically empirical Greek Sophists, (2) logically realistic constructs were
discovered and relationally axiomatized by Theaetetus, Eudoxus and
Chrysippus to take their place, and (8) the latter way of thinking passed
from the Greek mathematical physical sciences into Stoic Roman law
through Chrysippus, the Scaevolas and the later Stoic Roman lawyers.
23
Under Aristotle and the dominant epistemologists and philosophers
of the Middle Ages, natural science, ethics, law, politics and theology re-
turned to the naive realistic notion that there are no ideas in the intellect
which are not first in the senses. This made logically realistic constructs
meaningless. Modern mathematical physics arose when Galilei and New-
ton in their theory of heat, and of mathematical motion, space and time,
returned Western mathematical physics to the logically realistic theory.
Unfortunately, however, as noted in connection with Whitehead above,
due to the influence of ordinary language, these logically realistic con-
structs were interpreted naively realistically thereby generating the count-
less nonexistent material substances of the Hobbesian and Marxist mate-
rialists, the spiritual substances of Berkeley, Leibniz and the other
2 Id. at 37.
2See Sambursky, Structural and Dynamic Elements in the Greek Conception of
Physical Reality and Smith, The Theoretical Constructs of Western Contractual Law,
in LIVINGSTON & NORTHROP, CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING: EPISTEMOLOGY IN ANTHRO-
POLOGY (1964); also NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE
ch. 17 (1959).
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mentalists, and the interacting mental and material substances of modern
Cartesian and Lockean dualists.
Those of us in modern English-speaking culture are in the tradition
of either the naively realistic and materialistic Hobbes or the blank-
tabletish mental substances of the early Locke. From the latter theory
(since the mind, antecedent to the action of the material substances upon
it through the senses is a blank tablet), it follows that all meaningful words
must find their meaning in the senses. The result is the radical empirical
portion of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding from which
Hume, Bentham and Austin's theory of personal morals follows as does
Austin's inconsistency, noted above, of falling back on the naive realism
of Hobbes in order to account for universal litigational legal and political
obligation.
Need one wonder that present legal and political science and practice
are muddled? Our litigational contractual law is meaningless apart from
universal all-or-none principles which are logically realistic constructs
correlated with radically empirically given operational procedures and
definitions. Yet our English legal positivists and most American Legal
Realists, like the pre-Machian naive realistic materialistic physicists, have
been interpreting these concepts of their science in either naive realistic
Hobbesian terms (as have the dialectically materialistic Marxists) or in
completely radically empirical, postivistic ones. In any event, we conclude
that the settling of legal disputes by litigational means is warranted to the
extent that those disputes, including the facts of the case and the norms for
their decision, are stated in logical realistic relationally constructed lan-
guage with its epistemologically correlated, radical empirically described
operational procedures and references.
Such is the case, however, only for certain portions of Western positive
law. Although his book shows little awareness of the epistemological dis-
tinctions at the basis of what he describes, Professor F. H. Lawson's The
Rational Strength of English Law tells us most concisely what are the parts
of law which approximate a formulation in logically realistic language and
the parts which do not. He distinguishes them as those with a language of
"rational strength" and those without it. Legal language with "rational
strength" he describes as follows: Its concepts are (1) "intensely abstract"
and "perfectly defined," 24 (2) "completely generalised," 25 (3) "move among
themselves according to the rules of a game," and form (4) "a calculus re-
markably similar to mathematics." 26 (1) and (3) insure that such legal
language is neither radical empirical nor naive realistic in its meaning.
By (2) and (3) Professor Lawson means (as illustrated in "England['s] most
21 LAWSON, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW 79 (1951).
2 Id. at 90.
Id. at 79.
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important rule governing the interpretation of statutes",27) that (5) the
"words must be interpreted according to their grammatical meaning."28
(3) and (4) show this grammar not to be that of ordinary language as does
Professor Lawson's subsequent statement that the creation of such a legal
language (6) "made it necessary to devise a special form of logic or gram-
mar .... 1129
He notes one very important consequence of such language, with re-
spect to judicial judgments. It is that "judges have no great power to con-
trol [such] written law."30 Our epistemological analysis shows why. In logi-
cally realistic language, let it be recalled, the words, including even the
entity constructs such as mass, corporate personality, or the legal person,
derive their entire realistic meaning syntactically by way of the imageless,
logically formulated relations in which they function as entity variables
or terms. From this two things follow: (1) all logical relations or laws are
analytic, since the entity terms or variables mean only what the relational
syntax formally specifies them to mean. Consequently, (2) all logically
realistic laws hold for all instances of their variables on analytic, or tauto-
logical, grounds.
This is why logically realistic science has no difficulty in solving the
problem of pure mathematical, mathematical physical, or legal induction,
i.e., for finding a meaning for all of the instances of the entity variables
obeying the relationally formalized rules, be they non-normatively indica-
tive with respect to the facts of the subject matter or normatively obligatory
with respect to the norms of decision. Applied to litigational law this
means that it is not necessary to fall into the is-ought non sequitur and the
naive realistic metaphysical nonsense that is the Austinian-Hobbesian
definition of "laws, properly so-called," in order to provide any meaning
for the obligation of all logically realistic legal persons in the legal system
to be judged by its norms. Nor is Kelsen's extra ad hoc postulate "One
ought to obey the positive law" required.
It is to be emphasized that such is the case only to the extent that any
branch of positive law has been formulated, as a calculus, in logically
realistic technical legal language. To this extent, however, the American
Legal Realists' criticism of "judge-declared law" is misguided; the "norma-
tive ambiguity" and "metaphysical nonsense" is in the "Realists" them-
selves, rather than in the legal language, because, like the naive realistic
pre-Machian materialistic physicists, they have read naive realistic or
radical empirical meanings into words, the meaning of which is logically
realistic. Moreover, the Anglo-American legal positivists, with their radical
"Id. at 16.
2Ibid.
Id. at 87. See also p. 91.
MId. at 16.
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empirical theory of the meaning of all legal language, combined incom-
patibly with their Hobbesian naive realistic meaning of the words "moral,
legal and political freedom" and "legal and political obligation," are as
much guilty of this error as are the American legal realists. The serious
consequences of such a misreading (by some recent United States Supreme
Court justices and Austinian-Hobbesian secretaries of state) of the mean-
ing of the words "judicial review," "the Bill of Rights," "constitutional
law," "international law" and "a realistic foreign policy" are by no means
negligible.
31
The merit of the American legal realists is their demonstration of the
large amount of law which is not judge-declarable, but judge-made, and
more accurately described as a "primitive and muddled" mess. Our episte-
mological analysis shows that this is very great indeed. It includes not
merely all those parts of law, described by Professors F. H. Lawson and
Joseph C. Smith, which have not been formalized in logical realistic lan-
guage, but also the remainder as well when it is interpreted by the legal
positivists or by the American Legal Realists most of whom were naive
realists.
IV
At last we are in a position, by way of summary, to bring the over-all
results of our epistemological analysis of legal judgments to bear upon the
major question of this symposium, namely, the extent, if any, to which
"all black-all white" judicial judgments are meaningful and warrantable.
This, as shown above, is equivalent to asking whether judge-declarable
litigational law is both meaningful and warrantable.
Briefly stated, the answer is twofold: (1) Such is the case only for those
portions of law in which (a) the facts of the case and (b) the universally
obligatory norms of decision have been formulated in logically realistic
language and then interpreted by the judge logically realistically rather
than radically empirically or naive realistically. (2) For all other parts of
law, mediation is, strictly speaking, the only meaningful or warrantable
method.
With respect to (la), the putting of the facts of the case in logical real-
istic language means that the legal method for determining what is ad-
missible evidence, cannot be, as is so often the case at present, the naive
realistic direct observational "statement of facts" by the witnesses. In-
stead, it must be the method of logical realistic hypothesis, described in
the previous section, with its indirect method of testability, in which logi-
cally deduced theorems of the logically realistic theory are tested against
the epistemically correlated, ordinary linguistic statements of the wit-
31 NORTHROP, PmLosoPHIcAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACricAL PoLrncs chs. 11, 17, and
18 (1960).
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nesses, when these statements are interpreted completely radically empiri-
cally, i.e., as denoting in the case of each witness merely the de facto esse
est percipi successive perishing particular images that alone are directly
observed by him, rather than the thing-property objects and events which
the witness may naive realistically infer from these images and erroneously
reify into metaphysical nonsense. To drive each witness back from the
naive realistic meaning of his observational facts-of-the-case statements to
their radical empirical meaning is precisely what is done by a cross-examin-
ing attorney who "knows his business," i.e., who understands the episte-
mological ambiguity of most observational statements.
With respect to (lb), the putting of the norms of decision in logically
realistic terms and under such procedural rules has an equally important
implication. First, just as in logically realistic mathematical physics, or
logically realistic legal rules of evidence, meaning must be distinguished
from testability (meaning being completely logically realistic, and testabil-
ity being an epistemological correlation of radical empirical meaning with
logically realistic meaning); so, with respect to the norms of decision, (a)
normative meaning, which is completely logical realistic, must be dis-
tinguished from its (b) operational procedures and instrumental sanctions,
the latter (b) being an epistemic correlate of (i) logically realistic normative
meaning and (ii) radical empirical is meaning.
The importance of epistemic correlations for logically realistic rules
of evidence in legal science and mathematical physics is that they prevent
the confusion of unobservable logically realistic scientific objects and
laws, which are indirectly tested, with either directly observed sense ob-
jects or with purported directly observed naive realistically conceived ob-
jects. Such is the case because epistemic correlation is an epistemological
relation between items of knowledge known in two different ways and
which refer therefore to two different worlds of linguistic discourse. Epi-
stemic correlation, therefore, is not the relation of identity or of logical
implication between items of knowledge in the same linguistic world of
discourse. This is why the epistemic correlations, which any logical realistic
science requires, prevent the error of identifying (a) objective indirectly
tested, logically realistically conceived, unobservable objects and their laws
with (b) relative directly observable data. Similarly in logically realistic
legal science, the relation of epistemic correlation prevents the aforemen-
tioned error and non sequitur of identifying (a) a realistic legal obliga-
tion, which is an ought, with its epistemically correlated (b) a merely
instrumental and operational empirical police power, which per se is an is.
With respect to the part of present law that is not thus logical realisti-
cally articulated and interpreted, two things follow from previous sections.
First, strictly speaking, as realized by the Oriental radical empiricists, and,
in part at least, also by the late Dean Sturges, such legal disputes are
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meaningfully settled only by mediation. In other words, for radically
empirically conceived disputes even judge-declared law is meaningless.
Such is the case because the judge's statements of both the facts and the
normative legal evaluation of them are, if completely radical empirical in
meaning, as relative to the perceiver and hence incapable of giving mean-
ing to even a judge-made common law, as are the factual and evaluative
judgments of the parties to the dispute. Second, in a culture where dispute
settling has become litigational, the result for those disputes that are not
logical realistically formalized and interpreted will be a compromise be-
tween litigational law and mediational law. In other words, it will be in
part judge-made law when such a dispute is taken to court, in part legis-
lative litigationally authorized arbitration and mediation and in part
pressure by the head of the executive branch of government upon the
parties to the dispute to accept arbitration or mediation rather than the
consequences of litigation. The latter compromise is especially likely to
occur when the executive and his attorney general are approaching a na-
tional election.
Must one not also ask the question whether there is not merely an
epistemological muddle, but, in addition, something legally improper
when a chief executive publicly urges arbitration by a Supreme Court
justice of a dispute which has arisen because one of the parties to the dis-
pute proposes to put into practice what the Supreme Court, of which the
justice is a member, has declared to be litigationally just? At the least it
would seem to be the case that contemporary law is in the same "primitive
and muddled" state in which physics foundered before Mach and in which
Einstein tells us any subject ends when it neglects epistemology.
If this be so, one pedagogical conclusion seems to follow. Must not
lawyers, and especially law professors, supplement their present study of
linguistically expressed cases with an expertness in epistemology at least
sufficient to make them aware of (a) the various epistemological kinds
of meaning any word in their legal language may have, (b) the syntactical
and semantic criteria for recognizing each, and (c) the linguistic and meta-
physical nonsense and erroneous legal judgments which result when one
kind of meaning is confused with another?
One final question remains: Should not all dispute settling be made
mediational?
The answer must dearly be in the negative for the following reasons.
By means of an epistemological analysis of the meaning of its mathematical
and ordinary linguistic symbols, mathematical physics has escaped from
its earlier primitive and muddled state to make some of the most remark-
able advances in the achievement of more and more adequate logical
realistic theory that have ever occurred in human history. This theory has
generated present scientific technology and its instruments, including this
atomic age. The logically realistic instruments and ways of this age are
being imported from the modern West by everyone everywhere. In short,
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we are living, to a degree which was never the case before, in a logically
realistic world. Only judge-declarable logical realistic litigational law can
fit such a world.
Furthermore, the logically realistic atomic bomb makes naive realistic
Hobbesian-Austinian power politics and foreign policy suicidal. A logi-
cally realistic world, in this atomic age, calls for meaningful international
law. This, as shown elsewhere,32 only logically realistic legal science pro-
vides; for both naive realists and radical empiricists, both international law
and constitutional law are a contradiction in terms.
Finally, as demonstrated in earlier sections, law itself, especially insofar
as it has achieved the status of being a science rather than a linguistic
muddle, is in considerable part already logically realistic in meaning and
method. It is only the epistemological confusion of radical empirical and
naive realistic meaning with logically realistic meaning that has in recent
times covered up this fact. Moreover, the part that is already judge-declara-
ble, internationally meaningful and logically realistic is probably greater
than most lawyers now realize. In fact, constitutional law, instead of being
the joke that it is to so many law professors, is probably the most trust-
worthy part of contemporary law, as is logical realistically meaningful
international law.
One point noted above when combined with an empirical fact of our
world should make this dear. This point is that logically realistic norms
of decision are analytic and hence true tautologically. The empirical fact
is the appeal today by minority groups in our midst and peoples through-
out Asia and Africa to Jefferson's Declaration of Independence principle.
This Jeffersonian Declaration contains the word "self-evident." A princi-
ple can be self-evident only if it is analytic and hence true tautologically.
This indicates that American constitutional law and the Declaration of
Independence are falsely understood unless their language is interpreted
logically realistically.3
3
In any event, then one must expect that, as law teachers and lawyers
become more sophisticated epistemologically, judge-declarable logical
realistic litigational law is going to take on greater and greater importance
both domestically and internationally; also present parts of law that are
not now litigationally judge-declarable are likely to be put in such a form
by legal scientists who use the unique syntax and method of logical realistic
science. When this occurs they may well find that many of the old judge-
declarable constructs must be reformed, due to the fact that the legal
grammarians, who made them, inconsistently introduced naive realistic
normative content.
-12Id. at 316-38; also NORTHROP, THE CoMPLExrry oF LEGAL AND ETHIcAL EXPERIENCE
chs. 17 and 22 (1959).
"For a more detailed statement of what such an interpretation means, see Nor-
throp, Law, Language and Morals, 71 YAE LEJ. 1017, 1045-48 (1962).
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